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Electing an Enlarged Welsh Assembly

Simon King
University College, London WC1H 9EZ

 

3.

Conclusions

Comparing all the systems listed here, it is plain that very different outcomes in seats can come from the same popular division of the vote in an 80 member Assembly. In 2003, Labour ranges from an overwhelming 60 AMs to a disappointing 29. For the Conservatives the high point is 16 AMs and the low point two. Plaid Cymru ranges from 17 down to 7 and the Liberal Democrats from 17 to 3. The range is even greater when we consider how the results of the 2001 Westminster election would translate. Here Labour ranges from a high of 68 seats to a low of 37. The Conservatives range from 17 seats to none at all.

It is clear that smaller parties and independent candidates would benefit from a change in the electoral system in an 80 seat Assembly. Those systems that include a national list, predictably, benefit small parties the most since proportionality is maximized by a large district magnitude. The single-transferable-vote is almost impossible to simulate since we do not have a reliable indication of likely preference orders nor can we determine the number of candidates individual parties would run in particular constituencies.
The Gallagher Index in 2003 varies from 0.44 in the purest form of proportional calculations to 30.47 in the extreme case of FPTP. This emphasizes the disproportionality induced by the low regional district magnitude of the present 40:20 arrangement. Interestingly, switching from the d’Hondt divisor to modified Sainte Lägue on an 80 seat national list makes little difference to the overall result in any of the three simulations. Labour loses a single seat while small parties gain a mere one or two seats.
How do the different systems compare in generating majorities in the Assembly? For a single party to govern, the majority needed in our hypothetical 80 seat Assembly is 41 seats. In 1999 Labour achieves this in 4 out of the 10 alternative systems namely the three first-past-the-post alternatives and the 60:20 AMS option. This is also the case when we simulate the outcome of the 2001 vote on a hypothetical Assembly. In 2003 Labour is awarded a majority in 6 out of 10 alternatives, namely the FPTP, the STV and, again, the 60:20 AMS scenario. It is therefore in Labour’s interest, as a large party, to favour the least proportional systems. Otherwise, the only alternative government comprises a ‘rainbow’ of the Conservatives, Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats which is hardly politically likely. It seems that Labour could be permanently in power in Wales whether or not there is a change in the electoral system.

References
Benoit, K., 2000. District Magnitude, Electoral Formula and the Number of Parties. European Journal of Political Research, 39 (2), 203-224

Cox, G., 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge University Press, New York

Dalton, R., 2000. Political support in advanced industrial democracies. In Dalton, R., Wattenberg, M. (Eds.), Parties without Partisans, Oxford University Press, Oxford pp.57-84.

Gallagher, M., 1991 Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems. Electoral Studies 10, 33-51

Lijphart, A., 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Loosemore, J., Hanby, V., 1971. The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral Systems. British Journal of Political Science 1 (1), 467-77
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