Electing an Enlarged Welsh Assembly
Simon King
University College, London WC1H 9EZ
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2. Simulations
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In 2002, the Welsh Assembly government
instituted a Commission to review the powers and electoral
arrangements of the National Assembly. Part of its remit
was to consider whether the size of the Assembly is
adequate to allow it to operate effectively and whether
the means of electing the Assembly adequately represents
all significant interests in Wales. Commentators have
suggested that if the size of the Assembly were to be
increased that it should go up from 60 to 80 members.
What follows is an exploration of what might happen
under various methods of electing a National Assembly
for Wales if it were expanded from 60 to 80 members.
We take the election results of the two elections held
so far under AMS, in 1999 and 2003 as well as the 2001
Westminster contest and simulate them under different
electoral systems.
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The calculations are based on three scenarios:
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A.
B.
C |
Welsh voters divide just as they did in
the 1999 Assembly contest.
Welsh voters divide just as they did in the 2001 Westminster
election.
Welsh voters divide just as they did in the 2003 Assembly
contest. |
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Several systems are considered.
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- 80 single member seats elected by first-past-the-post
(FPTP).
- (a) 40 double member seats with each elector having
two votes (FPTP).
(b) 40 double member seats with each elector having
one vote (FPTP).
(c) 40 double member seats with each elector ranking
candidates by number and seats allocated using the
Droop quota (votes ÷ (seats + 1)) (STV).
- 40 single member seats (FPTP) and 40 AMs elected
on regional lists.
- 40 single member seats (FPTP) and 40 AMs elected
on a national list.
- 60 single member seats and 20 AMs elected on regional
lists.
- 80 members elected on national list exactly proportionately
using the Hare quota (votes ÷ seats).
- 80 members elected on national list using the existing
d’Hondt divisor (1,2,3,4…).
- 80 members elected on a national list using the
modified Sainte-Lägue divisor (1.4,3,5,7….) as
used in New Zealand.
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| Other systems are conceivable.
The most obvious would involve multi-member constituencies
(perhaps twenty 4-seaters) with election by the Single
Transferable Vote as used for the Dáil in the Republic
of Ireland and for the Northern Ireland Assembly. This
would produce a moderately proportional Assembly but might
provoke more individualistic politics and intra-party
conflict. It is very difficult to model its exact consequences
though it would rarely yield a clear majority for any
one party. |
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As the tables below show, the outcomes
can vary greatly both between the different systems
and between the 1999, 2001 and 2003 hypotheses. The
following calculations are subject to assumptions which
are arbitrary and in some cases plainly absurd.
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| i. |
In systems 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), where constituencies
are divided to make 80 seats out of 40, it has to be assumed
that the two halves are identical in partisan terms. This
would in fact not happen; in marginal cases the runner-up
party would certainly pick up one or two AMs and certain
parties would have concentrated support in certain areas
which would not make for an even distribution of the vote.
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| ii. |
In system 2b it is assumed that in certain
constituencies the leading party would show sophistication
in putting up two candidates and guiding half of its supporters
to support one candidate and half the other. Therefore
in seats where the winner’s majority is more than
twice the second candidate’s vote the second seat
is allocated to the winning party. However in 1999, in
2001 and in 2003 there were a few seats where the margin
was only just over twice the second vote and the efforts
to manage an exact division might have failed; in most
of these cases Labour would have been the loser. Labour
would perhaps win three to five seats fewer than these
tables suggest. Otherwise, the figures have been calculated
using single member constituency results only. This underestimates
the performance of small parties such as the Greens or
the UK Independence Party who concentrated their campaigns
on winning regional list seats. |
| iii. |
If Wales were to get 41 or 42 seats in the
ongoing Westminster redistribution, as is rumoured, the
need to redraw boundaries would complicate any arrangements
for the Welsh Assembly. This article assumes that Wales
will continue to have 40 Westminster seats. |
| iv. |
The regions of Wales are based on the five
MEP constituencies used in the 1994 European Parliament
election. From 2004 there will be only four Welsh MEPs—but
that need make no difference to the regions used for the
Welsh Assembly. Where relevant it is assumed that the
five regions will be maintained intact. |
| v. |
There is no way of knowing at all precisely
how voters would order their STV preferences. The figures
for system 2 (c) make the assumption that each party’s
supporters share the same preference ordering. Two possible
orderings are offered. (A) is based on an arbitrary set
of suggestions made by diverse observers; (B) is based
on the findings of the 1999 Welsh Election Survey. |
