Supplementary Memorandum from the Welsh Liberal Democrats

‘Electoral arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales: issues and questions for consultation’

The Welsh Liberal Democrat response

Introduction

Welsh Liberal Democrats made the case for a Welsh Senedd with primary lawmaking powers in our submission to the Richard Commission, Moving to a durable constitutional settlement: evidence for change, proposals for a solution (February 2003). In that submission we argued for an empowered Welsh Senedd with primary law-making powers to replace the National Assembly for Wales. We stated that the Senedd should consist of 80 members elected by the Single Transferable Vote (STV).

This submission to the Richard Commission builds upon our argument in favour of STV and is in response to the latest Richard Commission consultation paper, Electoral arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales: issues and questions for consultation. It also seeks to address those questions raised in the latest consultation not already addressed by the Welsh Liberal Democrats in our previous submission to the Commission.

In recent debate, some individuals have suggested introducing the Alternative Vote as apposed to the current Alternative Member System (AMS) system that is used in elections to the National Assembly. Welsh Liberal Democrats reject the Alternative Vote. As the Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System chaired by the late Lord Jenkins of Hillhead pointed out, AV offers little prospect of a move towards greater proportionality, and in some circumstances it is even less proportional than the First Past the Post (FPTP) system used for electing the House of Commons.

Constituency boundaries

Welsh Liberal Democrats consider that it would assist the democratic process for Senedd constituency boundaries to comprise whole Westminster constituencies. In that way, there would be coterminosity in constituency boundaries. Our proposal for a Senedd consisting of 80 members could be accommodated most easily in multi-member constituencies large enough for a variation in the number or boundaries of Westminster seats to have little impact.

We believe that electors also have important links with their cities, counties and regions, as well as individual constituencies. Those links should be the foundations upon which the multi-member constituencies should be built.

STV in multi-member constituencies would put all Assembly Members (AMs) on an equal footing. There would no longer be two categories of AM. Furthermore, the closed list system means that the political parties decide the order in which their candidates appear on the regional lists according to their own internal selection procedures, denying the electorate of the opportunity to chose the candidate that they want to see elected. Our proposal would put more power in the hands of the electorate.

Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that STV constituencies should be both recognisable as distinctive regions and constructed in such a way as to ensure that the major political parties stand a fair chance of securing the election of at least one of their members. STV is not guaranteed to produce such accuracy in proportional representation of parties as the party list or additional member systems, but with larger constituencies we believe that there is a reasonable chance of at least one member from each of the main Welsh parties being elected per STV constituency, ensuring that electors have a representative that reflects their political views. We therefore envisage multi member STV constituencies each electing between six and ten representatives to a Welsh Senedd. However, there are no guarantees that every party will be represented in each constituency, although we do believe that the result across Wales as a whole will be broadly proportional in relation to overall party support.

STV – principles and rationale

Power should be vested with the electorate and the representatives that they elect, and less with the machinery of political parties. We favour STV as the best method for empowering the electorate. It is so called as it is based upon the principle that the elector has a first choice of representative, but if the preferred candidate has either more votes than are needed for election or has the least votes with no chance of being elected, then votes are transferred pro rata to a second or subsequent choice. The system aims to give the voter the widest choice possible between candidates whilst eliminating, as far as is possible, wasted votes.

Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that STV will lead to proportionality in terms of the social profile of elected representatives in addition to securing greater proportional representation of political parties in terms of their popular support. Using STV, we believe that the system will encourage the election of more women and ethnic candidates. By allowing the elector to rank candidates in order of preference, voters can express a preference for a female candidate ahead of a male candidate, and similarly with a candidate from one of the ethnic minorities. This would also have the added advantage of reducing the need for all-women shortlists, twinning and zipping, methods that have been employed by various political parties to ensure that under-represented groups get elected.

Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that the constituency link is an important aspect of democracy in that it maintains the link between elected representatives and their electorate. As constituencies are multi-member under a system of STV, the number in each one can vary in accordance with natural boundaries, provided that the constituencies are large enough to achieve proportionality. This means that ‘artificial’ constituencies can be minimised.

Those opposed to multi-member constituencies have argued that there would be a need for large rural constituencies in order to achieve a population balance between urban and rural constituencies. Crucially though, not only will the constituency link will be maintained, the accountability of Senedd representatives would be considerably greater than under the present Alternative Member System (AMS). There would no longer be such a thing as a ‘safe seat’, with representatives enjoying huge majorities in traditional first past the post constituencies or list members comfortable in the knowledge that they are safe by virtue of their high position on the party lists.

STV will also reduce ‘negative voting’ whereby an elector will vote to ensure that a particular candidate does not win rather than voting positively for a candidate whose views they share and support, otherwise known as tactical voting. Parties would undoubtedly respond to this by developing policies to attract a wider cross-section of support, rather than rely upon tactical voting.

Crucially, STV reflects proportionally the electors' voting intentions far better than any other system. The equal value of every vote and the small number of votes that fail to elect any candidate of the voter’s choice is extremely small. Voter empowerment is this system’s most valuable asset.